Presumption in Parliamentary Debate: Examining Whately\u27s Ideas and their Application to an Emerging and Evolving Debate Style by Unruh, Tammy Duvanel
Abstract: Presumption as a part of formal debate is examined in this
paper, which discusses Richard Whately's ideas about presumption and
burden of proof in argumentation, how these ideas have been applied as
paradigms and judging criteria in competitive debate, and how these same
ideas fit into the practice of parliamentary debate. General conclusions
about broad applications of debate "rules" are drawn, then, from this
example, and suggestions are made for future study.
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Most debate coaches introduce the term "presumption" to their student
charges as a negative position by which one could argue that the status
quo was presumed to be "innocent" and had to be proven "guilty" before
the judge could vote for the affirmative--that the "burden of proof" is on
the affirmative. The negative can sit back and, with that infamous "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it" line of reasoning, win any round where "harm"
or "significance" seemed questionable by simply claiming presumption.
Policy debaters are taught that, most of the time, judges understand the
phrase "innocent until proven guilty" and agree with the line of reasoning
that advocating change for the sake of change is rarely justified and that
the damage presented by the affirmative to be acceptable must truly offset
the risks of change. Presumption functions as construct; a debate-rules
"given"; a monolithic advantage for the status quo in most policy debate
rounds (Sproule, 1976, p. 115). In their textbook The Art and Practice of
Argumentation and Debate, Hill and Leeman (1997) stated, "For many
years, scholars have treated presumption as a fixed or stipulated
convention of the debate process. Presumption is stipulated to a particular
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entity (belief, action, institution, person, and so on) before the interaction
begins, and that entity is assumed to retain its argumentative ground until
the burden of proof is fulfilled" (p. 144). These same authors stated later,
"In a formal debate, the negative always has presumption assigned via the
stipulated dimension and the affirmative always has the corollary burden
of proof" (p. 148). Of course, such a policy debate-based view of
presumption as part of rhetorical communication, while perhaps helpful as
a way of coming to a decision in debate rounds, certainly limits the
possible understanding of the theory. This paper will discuss Richard
Whately's writing about presumption and burden of proof in
argumentation, how these ideas have been applied as paradigms and
judging criteria in competitive debate, and how these same ideas fit (or do
not fit) into the practice of parliamentary debate. Finally, some
conclusions about broad application of debate rules are drawn from this
example, and suggestions are made for future study.
Richard Whately wrote and rewrote the sections of his Elements of
Rhetoric dealing with the theory of presumption and burden of proof
during the period 1830 to 1846. He first argued that presumption
operated in favor of an existing institution, an accused person or book,
and prevailing opinion. "As a result, a burden of proof falls on those who
(1) propose alterations in existing institutions, (2) make accusations in
court and (3) maintain an opinion contrary to the prevailing one" (Sproule,
p. 118). While Whately was the first rhetorician to use terms common in
courts of law to discuss persuasion, J. Michael Sproule (1976), in
Communication Monographs, asserted that Whately's theory of
presumption is much more than the convenient mating of jurisprudential
terms to the study of rhetorical communication. Sproule argued what is
important in studying Whately is not his initial claims alone, but evolution
of the Archbishop's theory from an essentially rule-based or legal entity,.
as described in the early versions of the Elements, to an audience-based
understanding of argumentation and persuasion. Sproule saw the gradual
development as indicative of "substantial changes in [Whately's] viewpoint
regarding the agency of assignment [of presumption] and the nature of the
advantage gained [by the same]" (p. 123).
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Most easily observable is Whately's attitude toward audience. In early
discussions of presumption, the audience is passive--merely observing the
argument. Later, Whately wrote "in anyone question the Presumption
will often be found to lie on different sides, in respect of different parties"
(p. 120) and, by 1836, Whately saw presumption as determined by
sociological factors, such as group membership, and psychological
factors, such as novelty, arguing that at times, assigned or stipulated
presumption is correctly rebutted or even overturned by new or novel
ideas. Whately's attitude toward audience and their role in assigning and
determining the importance of presumption in making decisions
culminated in Whately's statement that "advocates should not always
expect an otherwise plausible presumption to be perceived by a given set
of auditors. Presumption was an advantage, but an unrecognized
advantage counted for little. " Instead, in making a decision, "the
individual seeks the evidence, judges its merits, and, in the absence of
demonstrable proof, convinces himself of the certitude of the proposition"-
-a far cry from the passive audience of Whately's early writing (p. 123).
Critics of Whately saw no such explainable or understandable evolution of
thought, but merely the confusion of the Archbishop about his own
system. Gary Cronkhite (1966), for example, identified three types of
presumptions in Whately--psychological, legal and assertive--and claimed
that these were not types of presumption at all, but would be better
described as deference or consensus. He went on to claim that the least
confusing rule and the rule best employed in extra-legal argument is
simply "He who asserts must prove"(p. 270-271). The understanding of
the audience as to what constitutes proof was not a part of the
consideration of presumption; the purpose of presumption was to assign
the duty of proving assertions, not determining what would constitute that
proof.
Having discussed Whately's theory of presumption, an examination of the
application of these ideas to competitive debate is appropriate. As
discussed above, in traditional policy debate, presumption lies with the
status quo and, therefore, the negative side of the debate. This view is in
alignment with Whately's early writing about presumption. As Hill and




assumption that the status quo is good, only that the change might be
worse" (p.145). The judge, following a standard stock-issue or policy-
maker paradigm, would consider presumption as the negative's "right to
do no more than ask 'Why?'''(Cronkhite, 273-4) and thus advocate no
change in the current system unless the affirmative presented compelling
evidence of significant, continuing harm or of a comparatively
advantageous way of performing a task that existed and was precluded
manifestation by the current method of handling the same situation. "The
advocate with presumption has no responsibility to justify her or his
preoccupation of argumentative ground until the advocate with the burden
of proof provides sufficient reason to question that preoccupation" (Hill et
at, p. 147). Presumption also instructs a judge adopting a hypothesis-
testing paradigm. In their discussion of the hypo-testing paradigm,
Patterson and Zarefsky assert that presumption "indicates which side will
be presumed correct in the absence of argument to the contrary" and,
additionally, offer a "normative principle": "the fundamental presumption
ought to rest against the resolution in order to assure that the resolution
receives a through and rigorous test" (Lee & Lee, 1985, p. 169).
In "value" debate, presumption lies with the hierarchy of values
maintained by the status quo. Rather than a legislative understanding of
presumption, as discussed above in the realm of policy debate,
presumption in value debate is based more on a legal understanding of
presumption--that the accuser (here the affirmative) must prove the guilt of
the defendant. The burden of the affirmative, then, is to prove one of two
things: either the hierarchy of values maintained by the status quo is
flawed and should be rearranged, or some policy or group of policies in
place in the status quo does not reflect the hierarchy of values and should
be changed. In the first scenario, a policy or several policies are
presented to prove the skew in values--proof of "guilt"--then the.
affirmative proposes a reordering of values, which change in these same
policies would demonstrate. In the second scenario, a proposition for
change of a policy or policies is presented to bring certain policies into
line with the value hierarchy--the status quo would be proven "guilty" of
violating its own standards. While the nature of the "real-world
application/theoretic value structure" argument may be an exercise in
"chicken-and-egg" logic, the idea of legal presumption as a negative area
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of argumentation is clear. The negative can rest in the position of
presumption until the affirmative shows bad value-ordering or bad policies
in that values are violated, maintaining its "innocence" until good and
sufficient reasons proving "guilt" and justifying change are advanced. A
judge can certainly take a traditional policy-maker position and base a
decision on the policy changes advocated.
However, when making a decision, the debaters often ask the judge in a
value debate round, especially as value debate is currently practiced on the
CEDA circuit, to "weigh" one value against another or to decide which
side more adequately upholds one value, often through means of a
criterion for judgement. Affirmatives assert that traditional, stipulated
presumption is a less important construct for decision-making than an
applied "decision-rule" based on competing values--a type of what
Whately called psychological presumption, reflecting what a particular
person values and what that individual is likely to consider a "good
reason" to consider an affirmative proposition (Hill et al., p. 145).
Cronkhite takes issue with this sort of presumption as not being
presumption at all:
[T]he purpose of assigning presumption is to determine which
side has the burden of proof ... The ... modification of this
position which suggests that presumption always lies with
morality, 'rectitude,' orthodoxy, the 'true, right or expedient,' or
'whatever accords with the natural laws of Providence,' [cannot
be made because] arguments usually result from conflicts between
two views of what is moral, true, or orthodox. How, then could
presumption be assigned to one or the other?" (p.271)
Arnie Madsen and Allan D. Louden (1987), in the Journal of the
American Forensic Association, quoted Matlon:
"Definitions of presumption have undergone considerable change
in recent years ... [h]owever, all positions have one common
theme, namely [s]he who assumes the burden of proof must
produce the preponderance of argument" (p. 92).
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Madsen and Louden then go on to reason
"While this may be correct, it does not justify presumption in
value debate, to the extent its requisite burden of proof is one
which can apply to both the affirmative and the negative" (p. 92).
Stipulated presumption, then, may serve as a window through which to
view policy issues and value hierarchy issues as they emerge in value
debate rounds, but contention exists as to the role of any sort of
presumption when determining what a judge values or should "weigh"
when considering values at odds.
This is the milieu into which parliamentary debate as an emerging debate
style must step. Presumption, while still infinitely valuable as a construct
for legislatively modeled policy debate, may not be useful in value debate,
especially in areas outside policy consideration. As Whately described the
situation in the nineteenth century, presumption may exist in theory, but if
it is not seen as an advantage in the mind of the audience, it is useless as a
means to advocate an action. An examination of how debaters and critics
might evoke presumption in parliamentary debate rounds is in order.
Some rounds of parliamentary debate certainly suggest a wholehearted
adoption of a traditional legislative or legal understanding of presumption.
Consider a debate based on the resolution "This House would enact
campaign fmance reform." Obviously, a straightforward interpretation of
this prescriptive resolution would place the government in a position of
advocating change from the current practice of campaign fmancing or the
current regulation of campaign fmances. Either way, the opposition is
granted the presumption--the way things are currently being handled is
presumed to be adequate until some problem, abuse, injustice or like.
cause large enough to mandate a change is presented by the government.
However, the current practices of parliamentary debate, and especially
those practices of the government's right to defme terms in the resolution
and ground for debate, strain a traditional understanding of presumption as
an always-and-only negative/opposition advantage. A debate on the
metaphoric resolution "The house believes that blue is better than red,"
)
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for example, in which the government defmes "blue" as Capitalism and
"red" as Communism, calls for debate about two competing economic
systems. Both teams must advance reasons for the superiority of their
system; neither side could win the debate by merely asking "Why?"
(Assuming the debate takes place in the United States, when the
government team has defmed the resolution's terms in such a way as to
place themselves in a position advocating Capitalism, any presumption
based merely on the idea that this US status quo is capitalist is awarded to
the government, not the opposition.) Certainly, if presumption in some
form exists, it is located in the judge or audience's understanding of these
economic systems and not awarded by an examination of who asserts and
therefore proves.
Presumption, then, at least of the stipulated, construct variety, may not
exist in all rounds of parliamentary debate. Perhaps it should not. Ronald
Lee and Karen King Lee (1985), writing in the Central States Speech
Journal, suggest four specific criticisms of a rule-based approach to
presumption in argumentation, three of which are especially compelling
and should cause the parliamentary community to examine carefully how
tightly it wishes to embrace presumption (or any rule) as an always-
present, defming construct in debate rounds. First, the authors cite a lack
of what they call magnetism, noting that
"[a] rule reports on procedure rather than the speaker's interests.
Rules are external to the feeling of the speaker and do not
logically commit the interlocutor to the psychological
consequences of the statement" (p. 169).
Second,
[a] rule-based approach to presumption cannot account for the
direction of the listeners I interests. Rules do not have persuasive
impact beyond whatever implicit or explicit force the
accompanying sanctions may have. Whatever dynamic dimension
the meaning of presumption may entail, the use of rules makes
this an irrelevant consideration. To engage a rule is to make a
statement about procedure rather than to suggest to listeners that
59
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the rhetorical force of presumption speaks to intensify or redirect
their interests (p.170).
If the parliamentary debate community wishes to maintain public
accessibility to the activity as a goal, surely attention must be paid to
always keeping rules secondary to persuasive, logical argumentation as the
major reason for decision. Third, a rule-based approach regarding
presumption cannot allow intelligent disagreement over the assignment of
presumption.
"Competing presumptions characterize church and state disputes,
the deference to authority when two disciplines clash, and the
common struggle between value pairs such as freedom and
responsibility or the right to know and the right to privacy"
(p.170);
certainly the sort of arguments we all wish to hear in parliamentary debate
rounds and the sort of topics where students receive the greatest benefit of
the activity as they are forced to consider multidimensional issues from
varying sides.
Cronkhite stated that his purpose in writing was "not to determine what
the term [presumption] means, for its meaning for any given group can
best be determined empirically" (p. 270). A legitimate arena for
observation and discussion, then, is whether the parliamentary debate
community wishes to use the current understanding of presumption as
advanced by the NDT and CEDA or to come up with its own way of
understanding the idea of presumption.
Clearly, the use of presumption to determine which side in an argument.
must assume the burden of proof seems logical in situations where a
prescriptive resolution indicates that the government advocate change in
policy. The judge is clearly able to enter the round in a policy-maker role,
and the opposition can confidently occupy the ground it is given--secure
that, no matter how small their territory is, the burden of proof falls on the
government. Especially considering the fact that parliamentary topics are
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considered change are important ideas about which the opposition must be
able to argue fluently to overcome the audience's interest in the "novel
and current" over the "tried and true" and boring status quo.
However, demanding a fixed rule regarding presumption it probably not to
the advantage of parliamentary debate. While relying heavily on the
judge's ideas of what constitutes proof and who has to supply what amount
of it, rounds in which both sides must assert and prove can be educational
and allow for discussion of topics where the presumption isn't easily seen
if it exists at all. If success in parliamentary debate is going to remain
dependent upon the debaters' abilities to "read" an audience and on his or
her ability to think quickly and not on some evocation of rules specific to
the genre that mean little to nothing outside of a debate round, then the
parliamentary debaters, coaches, and judges must guard against
implementing rules from other forms of debate that may not apply readily
to the parliamentary format.
Several areas for further study are apparent. An analysis of some of the
traditional constructs and stock issues in policy and value debate and their
possible application or misapplication in parliamentary debate is needful.
For example, the stock issue of solvency has frustrated teams attempting
to debate the policy implications of parliamentary resolutions.
Resolutionality--the interpretation of the resolution advanced by the
government and how accurately it mirrors the actual resolution--could be
examined in light of topicality theory.
Also, a reexamination of the standard theorists, like Whately, and musing
about how their theories can apply to the new genre of debate would
provide an excellent area of primary source research and would allow
consideration of these ideas on their own merits and not as they have been
filtered through policy and value debate lenses in the past.
Whately's was a "contextualist" view of language and meaning, evidenced
by his assertion that use is "the only competent authority" in determing
the meaning of words (McKerrow, 1988, p. 219). Certainly we as
responsible coaches, judges, and debaters should use a variety of
arguments and argumentation theories to advocate our positions, and let
) )
our intelligent use of those types and theories instruct our debating rather
than invoking rules of debate-types past to shape our emerging and
evolving style of debate.
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